We propose a polynomial time quantum algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in matrices over nite group rings. The hardness of this problem was recently employed in the design of a keyexchange protocol proposed by D. Kahrobaei, C. Koupparis and V. Shpilrain [4] . Our result implies that the Kahrobaei-Koupparis-Shpilrain protocol does not belong to the realm of post-quantum cryptography.
Introduction
The discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in a nite cyclic group is an algorithmic question to nd for any given pair of elements , ℎ ∈ a number ∈ ℕ satisfying = ℎ. This problem is extremely important due to its relation to cryptography. One of the most prominent and long withstanding protocols, the Di e-Hellman key-exchange protocol, is based on the assumption that DLP is hard in certain groups. The Di e-Hellman protocol proposed in [1] was the rst practical solution to the key distribution problem, allowing two parties (Alice and Bob), never having met in advance or shared keying material, to establish a shared secret by exchanging messages over an open channel ( [9] ). Its basic version works as follows: Algorithm 1. Di e-Hellman key-agreement. One-time setup: Choose an appropriate prime and a generator of * with 2 ≤ ≤ − 2.
1: Alice chooses a random secret with 1 ≤ ≤ − 2 and sends mod to Bob. 2: Bob chooses a random secret with 1 ≤ ≤ − 2 and sends mod to Alice. 3: Alice receives and computes the shared key as = ( ) mod . 4: Bob receives and computes the shared key as = ( ) mod .
To break this scheme a passive eavesdropper must solve the Di e-Hellman problem or, more generally, the discrete logarithm problem (DLP) in . After 30 years of extensive research DLP still looks hard for a conventional computer. Nevertheless, it can be e ciently solved using a quantum computer. Shor in [17] showed that DLP can be solved by a quantum algorithm in polynomial time in any nite eld (where is prime and ∈ ℕ). Currently quantum computers are weak, but a full scale quantum computer (if ever built) will defeat all DLP-based and factorization-based schemes. This is a powerful motivator for the design and construction of quantum computers and for the study of new quantum computer algorithms. It also facilitates research on new cryptosystems that are secure against quantum computers, collectively called post-quantum cryptography. Currently post-quantum cryptography is mostly focused on four di erent approaches:
• Lattice-based cryptography such as NTRU ( [3] ) and GGH ( [2] ).
• Multivariate cryptography such as unbalanced oil and vinegar ([5] ).
• Hash-based signatures such as Lamport signatures ( [6] ) and Merkle ([10] ) signature scheme.
• Code-based cryptography that relies on error-correcting codes, such as McEliece encryption ( [7] ) and Niederreiter signatures ( [13] ).
For a recent survey of quantum-resistant public-key schemes see [16] . There are also attempts to employ the ideas from combinatorial group theory in the design of cryptographic primitives secure in a post-quantum world ( [11, 12] ). In particular, there are ideas of how to generalize the original Di e-Hellman protocol using di erent group-oriented constructions. For instance, Odoni, Varadharajan and Sanders in [14] suggested to use exponentiation in a group of non-singular matrices over a nite eld GL ( ). That proposal was cryptanalyzed by Menezes and Wu in [8] who showed that there exists a probabilistic polynomial time reduction of DLP in GL ( ) to DLP in some small extension eld of , proving that the proposal brings nothing new to the eld.
More recently, D. Kahrobaei, C. Koupparis and V. Shpilrain in [4] considered yet another variation of the Di e-Hellman key-exchange protocol which uses the ring of 3 × 3 matrices over a group ring 7 [ 5 ]. The authors claim that the new scheme can withstand quantum algorithm attacks and provide some supporting arguments. In this paper we disprove that claim. In more detail, we prove that the ring 3 ( 7 [ 5 ]) can be embedded into a ring 360 ( 7 ) (see below for precise de nitions) and generalize the Menezes-Wu reduction to the case of a singular base matrix. This e ciently reduces DLP in 3 ( 7 [ 5 ]) to DLP in some small extension eld (of dimension smaller than or equal to 360) of which is nally fed to the Shor's quantum algorithm. This proves the following results: In Section 2 we give the de nition of a group ring and describe the Kahrobaei-Koupparis-Shpilrain protocol.
In Section 3 we recall the Menezes-Wu reduction and extend it to singular matrices. In Section 4 we describe the embedding construction and brie y discuss the results of experiments.
Group rings and Kahrobaei-Koupparis-Shpilrain protocol
Let = { 1 , . . . , } be a nite group of order and let be a commutative ring. The group ring [ ] is the set of formal linear combinations of the elements , that is, ∑ =1 , ∈ , equipped with addition and multiplication de ned as follows:
It is easy to see that multiplication is not commutative unless the group is commutative. For more on group rings see [15] . By we denote the group of permutations on elements. We denote by 
Menezes-Wu reduction and singular matrices
The original reduction is described for invertible matrices only. To design an algorithm for matrices over group rings we need a more general technique which works with singular matrices as well. We start out with the description of the original reduction following by the modi cations which extend the reduction to arbitrary matrices. Let ∈ GL( , ) (where = and is prime) and = . Our goal is to nd a number ∈ ℕ satisfying = . Below we sketch the Menezes-Wu algorithm which uses Shor's quantum algorithm for factoring integers [17] .
(1) Using Hessenberg algorithm compute the characteristic polynomial ( ) for and using Ben-Or's algorithm express it as a product
where the are distinct and irreducible. (2) Some su ciently large extension of contains the eigenvalues 1 , . . . , for . Unfortunately, can be very large. To avoid this problem consider the following extensions separately:
where is the irreducible polynomial for , and describe the structure of the Jordan form for . This can be done regardless of being invertible or not. 
. , ord( )) ⋅ { },
where ord( ) is the order of in ( ), is the size of the largest Jordan block and { } is the least power of greater than or equal to . The number is uniquely determined modulo ord( ). (4) Using quantum computer we can e ciently nd prime power factorization for the numbers
Given the factorization of deg( ) − 1 it is straightforward to compute ord( ). (Note that the original paper [8] neglects to compute ord( ). The problem of computing the order of an element in a nite eld does not have a deterministic polynomial time solution.) (5) For every eigenvalue of nd (conjugating by an appropriate matrix) the corresponding eigenvalue of . Using quantum computer solve the DLP in ( ) which gives a number satisfying = in ( ). This gives a relation ≡ mod ord( ).
(6) Compute = mod { } as described in [8] . (7) Finally, using the Generalized Chinese Remainder Theorem solve the system of linear congruences
and compute mod ord( ). For a detailed description of the algorithm we refer the reader to the original paper by Menezes and Wu. Now, if is a singular matrix, then some eigenvalues are trivial and the Jordan form of is a direct sum ⊕ of a non-singular block and a singular block . Recall that a matrix is called nilpotent if = 0 for some ∈ ℕ. The least positive satisfying = 0 is called the degree of nilpotency. It is easy to see that a singular Jordan × -block is nilpotent of degree . Hence, the singular block is nilpotent of degree , where is the size of a largest singular Jordan block in . Therefore, for some invertible matrix we have
Furthermore, and ord( ) are the least positive numbers satisfying the equality above. The number ord( ) can be computed as in Menezes-Wu and the number is the size of a largest singular Jordan block. Next, to solve an instance ( , ) of DLP in ( ) we do the following: • Describe the Jordan normal forms for and . Let and be the non-singular blocks and let and be the singular blocks for and , respectively. These matrices are not given explicitly, they are described as direct sums of their Jordan blocks. As mentioned in the item (2) above, each Jordan block requires taking the nite extension ( ) which has dimension deg( , ) ≤ .
• Applying Menezes-Wu and Shor's algorithms, solve the DLP for the instance ( , ) and obtain the number ὔ satisfying Thus, if the solution exists, then it must belong to the set
which contains up to numbers, which is not greater than . Straightforward veri cation of all the numbers nishes the algorithm This gives a required quantum algorithm for singular matrices.
The embedding
In this section we describe the reduction of the discrete logarithm problem in . . .
It is easy to see that ⋅ = .
Therefore, the right multiplication in [ ] is a linear transformation of and can be naturally interpreted in ( ). Finally observe that DLP in the ring 3 ( 7 [ 5 ]) used by Kahrobaei-Koupparis-Shpilrain is a particular case of the problem described above and, therefore, can be solved e ciently on a quantum computer using the described reduction.
Out of curiosity we implemented the embedding and obtained the following statistics: 30% of randomly uniformly generated matrices ∈ 3 ( 7 [ 5 ]) have * ∈ GL 360 ( 7 ). This means that 30% of instances of DLP 3 ( 7 [ 5 ]) reduce to elements of GL 360 ( 7 ) and the original Menezes-Wu reduction works for them. Other 70% of the instances require generalized technique described in the end of Section 3.
Conclusion
We presented a probabilistic polynomial-time quantum algorithm for solving the discrete logarithm problem in the ring ( [ ]) for any xed nite group . As a consequence we showed that the protocol proposed by Kahrobaei-Koupparis-Shpilrain is vulnerable to quantum algorithm attacks and does not belong to the realm of post-quantum cryptography.
